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Abstract
Approachability theory, introduced by Blackwell (1956), provides fundamental results on
repeated games with vector-valued payoffs, and has been usefully applied since in the the-
ory of learning in games and to learning algorithms in the online adversarial setup. Given
a repeated game with vector payoffs, a target set S is approachable by a certain player
(the agent) if he can ensure that the average payoff vector converges to that set no matter
what his adversary opponent does. Blackwell provided two equivalent sets of conditions
for a convex set to be approachable. The first (primary) condition is a geometric separa-
tion condition, while the second (dual) condition requires that the set be non-excludable,
namely that for every mixed action of the opponent there exists a mixed action of the agent
(a response) such that the resulting payoff vector belongs to S. Existing approachability
algorithms rely on the primal condition and essentially require to compute at each stage
a projection direction from a given point to S. In this paper, we introduce an approach-
ability algorithm that relies on Blackwell’s dual condition. Thus, rather than projection,
the algorithm relies on computation of the response to a certain action of the opponent at
each stage. The utility of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated by applying it to certain
generalizations of the classical regret minimization problem, which include regret mini-
mization with side constraints and regret minimization for global cost functions. In these
problems, computation of the required projections is generally complex but a response is
readily obtainable.
1. Introduction
Consider a repeated matrix game with vector-valued rewards that is played by two players,
the agent and the adversary or opponent. In a learning context the agent may represent the
learning algorithm, while the adversary stands for an arbitrary or unpredictable learning
environment. For each pair of simultaneous actions a and z (of the agent and the opponent,
respectively) in the one-stage game, a reward vector r(a, z) ∈ Rℓ, ℓ ≥ 1, is obtained. In
Blackwell’s approachability problem (Blackwell, 1956), the agent’s goal is to ensure that
the long-term average reward vector approaches a given target set S, namely converges to S
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almost surely in the point-to-set distance. If that convergence can be ensured irrespectively
of the opponent’s strategy, the set S is said to be approachable, and a strategy of the agent
that satisfies this property is an approaching strategy (or algorithm) for S.
Blackwell’s approachability results have been broadly used in theoretical work on learn-
ing in games, including equilibrium analysis in repeated games with incomplete information
(Aumann and Maschler, 1995), calibrated forecasting (Foster, 1999), and convergence to
correlated equilibria (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000). The earliest application, however, con-
cerned the notion of regret minimization, or no-regret strategies, that was introduced in
Hannan (1957). Even before Hannan’s paper was published, it was shown in Blackwell
(1954) that regret minimization can be formulated as a particular approachability problem,
which led to a distinct class of no-regret strategies. More recently, approachability was used
in Rustichini (1999) to prove an extended no-regret result for games with imperfect moni-
toring, while Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) proposed an alternative formulation of no-regret as
an approachability problem (see Section 2). An extensive overview of approachability and
no-regret in the context of learning is games can be found in Fudenberg and Levine (1998),
Young (2004), and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006). The latter monograph also makes the
connection to the modern theory of on-line learning and prediction algorithms. In a some-
what different direction, approachability theory was applied in Mannor and Shimkin (2004)
to a problem of multi-criterion reinforcement learning in an arbitrarily-varying environment.
Standard approachability algorithms require, at each stage of the game, the computation
the direction from the current average reward vector to a closest point in the target set S.
This is implied by Blackwell’s primal geometric separation condition, which is a sufficient
condition for approachability of a target set. For convex sets, this step is equivalent to
computing the projection direction of the average reward onto S. In this paper, we introduce
an approachability algorithm that avoids this projection computation step. Instead, the
algorithm relies on availability of a response map, that assigns to each mixed action q of the
opponent a mixed action p of the agent so that r(p, q), the expected reward vector under
these two mixed actions, is in S. Existence of such a map is based on the Blackwell’s dual
condition, which is also a necessary and sufficient condition for approachability of a convex
target set.
The idea of constructing an approachable set in terms of a general response map was
employed in Lehrer and Solan (2007) (updated in Lehrer and Solan (2013)), in the context
of internal no-regret strategies. An explicit approachability algorithm which is based on
computing the response to calibrated forecasts of the opponent’s actions has been proposed
in Perchet (2009), and further analyzed in Bernstein et al. (2013). However, the algorithms
in these papers are essentially based on the computation of calibrated forecasts of the
opponent’s actions, a task which is known to be computationally hard (Hazan and Kakade,
2012). In contrast, the algorithm proposed in the present paper operates strictly in the
payoff space, similarly to Blackwell’s approachability algorithm.
The main motivation for the proposed algorithm comes from certain generalizations of
the basic no-regret problem, where the set to be approached is complex so that computing
the projection direction may be hard, while the response map is explicit by construction.
These generalizations include the constrained regret minimization problem (Mannor et al.,
2009), regret minimization with global cost functions (Even-Dar et al., 2009), regret min-
imization in variable duration repeated games (Mannor and Shimkin, 2008), and regret
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minimization in stochastic game models (Mannor and Shimkin, 2003). In these cases, the
computation of a response reduces to computing a best-response in the underlying regret
minimization problem, and hence can be carried out efficiently. The application of our
algorithm to some of these problems is discussed in Section 5 of this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the approachability problem
and existing approachability algorithms, and illustrate the formulation of standard no-
regret problems as approachability problems. Section 3 presents our basic algorithm and
establishes its approachability properties. In Section 4, we provide an interpretation of
certain aspects of the proposed algorithm, and propose some variants and extensions to
the basic algorithm. Section 5 applies the proposed algorithms to generalized no-regret
problems, including constrained regret minimization and online learning with global cost
functions. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Review of Approachability and Related No-Regret Algorithms
In this Section, we present the approachability problem and review Blackwell’s approacha-
bility conditions. We further discuss existing approachability algorithms, and illustrate the
application of the approachability framework to classical regret minimization problems.
2.1 Approachability Theory
Consider a repeated two-person matrix game, played between an agent and an arbitrary
opponent. The agent chooses its actions from a finite set A, while the opponent chooses its
actions from a finite set Z. At each time instance n = 1, 2, ..., the agent selects its action
an ∈ A, observes the action zn ∈ Z chosen by the opponent, and obtains a vector-valued
reward Rn = r(an, zn) ∈ Rℓ, where ℓ ≥ 1, and r : A× Z → Rℓ is a given reward function.
The average reward vector obtained by the agent up to time n is then R¯n = n
−1∑n
k=1Rk.
A mixed action of the agent is a probability vector p ∈ ∆(A), where p(a) specifies the
probability of choosing action a ∈ A, and ∆(A) denotes the set of probability vectors over
A . Similarly, q ∈ ∆(Z) denotes a mixed action of the opponent. Let q¯n ∈ ∆(Z) denote
the empirical distribution of the opponent’s actions at time n, namely
q¯n(z) ,
1
n
n∑
k=1
I {zn = z} , z ∈ Z,
where I is indicator function. Further define the Euclidean span of the reward vector as
ρ , max
a,z,a′,z′
∥∥r(a, z)− r(a′, z′)∥∥ , (1)
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. The inner product between two vectors v ∈ Rℓ and w ∈ Rℓ
is denoted by v · w.
In what follows, we find it convenient to use the notation
r(p, q) ,
∑
a∈A,z∈Z
p(a)q(z)r(a, z)
for the expected reward under mixed actions p ∈ ∆(A) and q ∈ ∆(Z); the distinction
between r(a, z) and r(p, q) should be clear from their arguments. Occasionally, we will use
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r(p, z) =
∑
a∈A p(a)r(a, z) for the expected reward under mixed action p ∈ ∆(A) and pure
action z ∈ Z. The notation r(a, q) is to be interpreted similarly.
Let
hn , {a1, z1, ..., an, zn} ∈ (A×Z)n
denote the history of the game up to (and including) time n. A strategy π = (πn) of the
agent is a collection of decision rules πn : (A×Z)n−1 → ∆(A), n ≥ 1, where each mapping
πn specifies a mixed action pn = πn(hn−1) for the agent at time n. The agent’s pure action
an is sampled from pn. Similarly, the opponent’s strategy is denoted by σ = (sigman), with
σn : (A×Z)n−1 → ∆(Z). Let Pπ,σ denote the probability measure on (A×Z)∞ induced
by the strategy pair (π, σ).
Let S be a given target set. Below is the classical definition of an approachable set from
Blackwell (1956).
Definition 1 (Approachable Set) A closed set S ⊆ Rℓ is approachable by the agent’s
strategy π if the average reward R¯n = n
−1∑n
k=1Rk converges to S in the Euclidian point-
to-set distance d(·, S), almost surely for every strategy σ of the opponent, at a uniform rate
over all strategies σ of the opponent. That is, for every ǫ > 0 there is an integer N such
that, for every strategy σ of the opponent,
P
π,σ
{
d
(
R¯n, S
) ≥ ǫ for some n ≥ N} < ǫ.
The set S is approachable if there exists such a strategy for the agent.
In the sequel, we find it convenient to state most of our results in terms of the expected
average reward, where expectation is applied only to the agent’s mixed actions:
r¯n =
1
n
n∑
k=1
rk ,
1
n
n∑
k=1
r(pk, zk).
With this modified reward, the stated convergence results will be shown to hold pathwise,
for any possible sequence of the opponent’s actions. See, e.g., Theorem 6, where we show
that d(r¯n, S) ≤ ρ√n for all n. The corresponding almost sure convergence for the actual
average reward R¯n can be easily deduced using martingale convergence theory. Indeed,
note that
d
(
R¯n, S
) ≤ ∥∥R¯n − r¯n∥∥+ d (r¯n, S) .
But the first term is the norm of the mean of the vector martingale difference sequence
Dk = r(ak, zk)− r(pk, zk). This can be easily shown to converge to zero at a uniform rate of
O (1/
√
n), using standard results (e.g., from Shiryaev (1995)); see for instance Shimkin and
Shwartz (1993), Proposition 4.1. In particular, it can be shown that there exists a finite
constant K so that for each δ > 0
∥∥R¯n − r¯n∥∥ ≤ K log(1/δ)√
n
with probability at least 1− δ.
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Next, we present a formulation of Blackwell’s results (Blackwell, 1956) which provides
us with conditions for approachability of general and convex sets. To this end, for any
x /∈ S, let c(x) ∈ S denote a closest point in S to x. Also, for any p ∈ ∆(A) let T (p) ,
{r(p, q) : q ∈ ∆(Z)}, which coincides with the convex hull of the vectors {r(p, z)}z∈Z .
Definition 2
(i) B-sets: A closed set S ⊆ Rℓ will be called a B-set (where B stands for Blackwell) if for
every x /∈ S there exists a mixed action p∗ = p∗(x) ∈ ∆(A) such that the hyperplane
through y = c(x) perpendicular to the line segment xy, separates x from T (p∗).
(ii) D-sets: A closed set S ⊆ Rℓ will be called a D-set (where D stands for Dual) if for
every q ∈ ∆(Z) there exists a mixed action p ∈ ∆(A) so that r(p, q) ∈ S. We shall
refer to such p as an S-response (or just response) of the agent to q.
Theorem 3
(i) Primal Condition and Algorithm. A B-set is approachable, by using at time n
the mixed action p∗(r¯n−1) whenever r¯n−1 /∈ S. If r¯n−1 ∈ S, an arbitrary action can
be used.
(ii) Dual Condition. A closed set S is approachable only if it is a D-set.
(iii) Convex Sets. Let S be a closed convex set. Then, the following statements are
equivalent: (a) S is approachable, (b) S is a B-set, (c) S is a D-set.
We note that the approachability algorithm in Theorem 3(i) is valid also if r¯n in the
primal condition is replaced with R¯n. In addition, Theorem 3 has the following Corollary.
Corollary 4 The convex hull of a D-set is approachable (and is also a B-set).
Proof The convex hull of a D-set is a convex D-set. The claim then follows by Theorem 3.
Since Blackwell’s original construction, some other approachability algorithms that are
based on similar geometric ideas have been proposed in the literature. Hart and Mas-
Colell (2001) proposed a class of approachability algorithms that use a general steering
direction with separation properties. As shown there, this is essentially equivalent to the
computation of the projection to the target set in some norm. When Euclidean norm is used,
the resulting algorithm is equivalent to Blackwell’s original scheme. Recently, Abernethy
et al. (2012) proposed an elegant scheme which generates the required steering directions
through a no-regret algorithm (in the online convex programming framework). We provide
in the Appendix a somewhat simplified version of that algorithm which is meant to clarify
the geometric basis of the algorithm, which involves the support function of the target set.
We mention in passing some additional theoretical results and extensions. Vieille (1992)
studied the weaker notions of weak approachability and excludability, and showed that
these notions are complimentary even for non-convex sets. Spinat (2002) formulated a
necessary and sufficient condition for approachability of general (not necessarily convex)
sets. In Shimkin and Shwartz (1993) and Milman (2006), approachability was extended
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to stochastic (Markov) game models. An extension of approachability theory to infinite
dimensional reward spaces was carried out in Lehrer (2002), while Lehrer and Solan (2009)
considered approachability strategies with bounded memory.
Recently, Mannor et al. (2011) proposed a robust approachability algorithm for repeated
games with partial monitoring and applied it to the corresponding regret minimization
problem.
In all these papers, at each time step, either the computation of the projection to the
target set, or that of a steering direction with separation properties is required.
2.2 Approachability and No-Regret Algorithms
We next present the problem of regret minimization in repeated matrix games, and show
how these problems can be formulated in terms of approachability with an appropriately
defined reward vector and target set. We start with Blackwell’s original formulation, and
proceed to the alternative one by Hart and Mas-Colell (2001). In the final subsection, we
consider briefly the more elaborate problem of internal regret minimization. We will mainly
emphasize the role of the dual condition and the simple computation of the response for
these problems, and refer to the respective references for details of the (primal) resulting
algorithms.
Consider, as before, the agent that faces an arbitrarily varying environment (the oppo-
nent). The repeated game model is the same as above, except that the vector reward
function r is replaced by a scalar reward (or utility) function u : A × Z → R. Let
U¯n , n
−1∑n
k=1 Uk denote the average reward by time n, and let
U∗n(z1, ..., zn) ,
1
n
max
a∈A
n∑
k=1
u(a, zk)
denote the best reward-in-hindsight of the agent after observing z1, ..., zn. That is, U
∗
n is
the maximal average reward the agent could obtain at time n if he knew the opponent’s
actions beforehand and used a single fixed action. It is not hard to see that the best reward-
in-hindsight can be defined as a convex function u∗ of the empirical distribution q¯n of the
opponent’s actions:
U∗n(z1, ..., zn) = max
a∈A
u(a, q¯n) , u
∗(q¯n). (2)
This motivates the definition of the average regret as (u∗(q¯n) − U¯n), and the following
definition of a no-regret algorithm:
Definition 5 (No-Regret Algorithm) We say that a strategy of the agent is a no-regret
algorithm (also termed a Hannan Consistent strategy) if
lim sup
n→∞
(
u∗(q¯n)− U¯n
) ≤ 0,
almost surely, for any strategy of the opponent.
2.2.1 Blackwell’s Formulation
Following Hannan’s seminal paper, Blackwell (1954) used approachability theory in order
to elegantly show the existence of regret minimizing algorithms. Define the vector-valued
6
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rewards Rn , (Un,1(zn)) ∈ R × ∆(Z), where 1(z) is the probability vector in ∆(Z)
supported on z. The corresponding average reward is then R¯n , n
−1∑n
k=1Rk =
(
U¯n, q¯n
)
.
Finally, define the target set
S = {(u, q) ∈ R×∆(Z) : u ≥ u∗(q)} .
It is easily verified that this set is a D-set: by construction, for each q there exists an
S-response p ∈ argmaxp∈∆(Z) u(p, q) so that r(p, q) = (u(p, q), q) ∈ S, namely u(p, q) ≥
u∗(q). Also, S is a convex set by the convexity of u∗(q) in q. Hence, by Theorem 3, S is
approachable, and by the continuity of u∗(q), an algorithm that approaches S also minimizes
the regret in the sense of Definition 5. Application of Blackwell’s approachability strategy
to the set S therefore results in a no-regret algorithm. We note that the required projection
of the average reward vector onto S is somewhat implicit in this formulation.
2.2.2 Regret Matching
An alternative formulation, proposed in Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), leads to a a simple
and explicit no-regret algorithm for this problem. Let
Ln(a
′) ,
1
n
n∑
k=1
(
u(a′, zk)− u(ak, zk)
)
(3)
denote the regret accrued due to not using action a′ constantly up to time n. The no-regret
requirement in Definition 5 is then equivalent to
lim sup
n→∞
Ln(a) ≤ 0 a ∈ A (4)
almost surely, for any strategy of the opponent. In turn, this goal is equivalent to the
approachability of the the non-positive orthant S = RA− in the game with vector payoff
r = (ra′) ∈ RA, defined as ra′(a, z) = u(a′, z)− u(a, z).
To verify the dual condition, observe that ra′(p, q) = u(a
′, q) − u(p, q). Choosing p ∈
argmaxp u(p, q) clearly ensures r(p, q) ∈ S, hence is an S-response to q (in the sense of
Definition 2(ii)), and S is a D-set. Note that the response here can always be taken as a
pure action.
It was shown in Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) that application of Blackwell’s approacha-
bility strategy in this formulation leads to the so-called regret matching algorithm, where
the probability of action a at time step n is given by:
pn(a) =
[Ln−1(a)]+∑
a′∈A [Ln−1(a′)]+
. (5)
Here, [xa]+ , max{xa, 0}. In fact, using their generalization of Blackwell’s approachability
strategies, the authors of that paper obtained a whole class of no-regret algorithms with
different weighting of the components of Ln.
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2.2.3 Internal Regret
We close this section with another application of approachability to the stronger notion of
internal regret. Given a pair of different actions a, a′ ∈ A, suppose the agent were to replace
action a with a′ every time a was played in the past. His reward at time k = 1, ..., n would
become:
Wk(a, a
′) ,
{
u(a′, zk), if ak = a,
u(ak, zk), otherwise.
The internal average regret of the agent for not playing a′ instead of a is then given by
In(a, a
′) ,
1
n
n∑
k=1
(
Wk(a, a
′)− Uk
)
. (6)
A no-internal-regret strategy must ensure that
lim sup
n→∞
max
a,a′∈A
In(a, a
′) ≤ 0. (7)
To show existence of such strategies, define the vector-valued reward function r(a, z) ∈
R
A×A by setting its (a1, a2) coordinate to
ra1,a2(a, z) ,
{
u(a2, z)− u(a1, z), if a = a1,
0, otherwise.
Internal no-regret is then equivalent to approachability of the negative quadrant S0 = {r ≤
0}. It is easy to verify that S0 is a D-set, by pointing out the response map: Given a mixed
action q of the opponent, choosing a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A u(a, q) clearly results in r(a∗, q) ≤ 0.
Therefore, By Theorem 3(iii), the set S0 is approachable.
The formulation of internal-no-regret as the approachability problem above, along with
explicit approaching strategies, in due to Hart and Mas-Colell (2000). The importance of
internal regret in game theory stems from the fact that if each player in a repeated N -player
game uses such a no-internal regret strategy, then the empirical distribution of the players’
actions convergence to the set of correlated equilibria. Some interesting relations between
internal and external (Hannan’s) regret are discussed in Blum and Mansour (2007).
3. Response-Based Approachability
In this section, we present our basic algorithm and establish its approachability properties.
Throughout the paper, we consider a target set S that satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The set S is a convex and approachable set. Hence, by Theorem 3, S is a
D-set: For all q ∈ ∆(Z) there exists an S-response p ∈ ∆(A) such that r(p, q) ∈ S.
Under this assumption, we may define a response map pS : ∆(Z) → ∆(A) that assigns to
each mixed action q a response pS(q) so that r(pS(q), q) ∈ S.
We note that in some cases of interest, including those discussed in Section 5, the
target S may itself be defined through an appropriate response map. Suppose that for each
8
Response-Based Approachability
q ∈ ∆(Z), we are given a response p∗(q) ∈ ∆(A), devised so that r(p∗(q), q) satisfies some
desired properties. Then the set S = conv{r(p∗(q), q), q ∈ ∆(Z)} is, by construction, a
convex D-set, hence approachable.
We next present our main results and the basic form of the related approachability
algorithm. The general idea is the following. By resorting to the response map, we create
a specific sequence of target points (r∗k) with r
∗
k ∈ S. Letting
r¯∗n =
1
n
n∑
k=1
r∗k
denote the n-step average target point, it follows that r¯∗n ∈ S by convexity of S. Finally,
the agents actions are chosen so that the difference r¯∗n− r¯n converges to zero, implying that
r¯n converges to S.
Let
λn , r¯
∗
n − r¯n
denote the difference between the average target vector and the average reward vector.
Theorem 6 Let λ0 = 0. Suppose that at each time step n ≥ 1, the agent chooses its mixed
action pn (from which an is sampled) and two additional mixed actions q
∗
n ∈ ∆(Z) and
p∗n ∈ ∆(A) as follows:
(i) pn and q
∗
n are equilibrium strategies in the zero-sum game with payoff matrix defined
by r(a, z) projected in the direction λn−1, namely,
pn ∈ argmax
p∈∆(A)
min
q∈∆(Z)
λn−1 · r(p, q), (8)
q∗n ∈ argmin
q∈∆(Z)
max
p∈∆(A)
λn−1 · r(p, q), (9)
(ii) p∗n is chosen as an S-response to q∗n, so that r(p∗n, q∗n) ∈ S; set r∗n = r(p∗n, q∗n).
Then
d (r¯n, S) ≤ ‖λn‖ ≤ ρ√
n
, n ≥ 1, (10)
for any strategy of the opponent.
Observe that the required choice of p∗n as an S-response to q∗n is possible due to our standing
Assumption 1. The conclusion of this theorem clearly implies that the set S is approached
by the specified strategy, and provides an explicit bound on the rate of convergence. The
approachability algorithm implied by Theorem 6 is summarized in Algorithm 1.
The computational requirements Algorithm 1 are as follows. The algorithm has two
major computations at each time step n:
1. The computation of the (pn, q
∗
n) – the equilibrium strategies in the zero-sum matrix
game with the reward function λn−1 · r(p, q). This boils down to the solution of the
related primal and dual linear programs, and hence can be done efficiently. Note that,
given the vector λn−1, this computation does not involve the target set S.
9
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2. The computation of the target point r∗n = r(p∗n, q∗n), which is problem dependent. For
example, in the constrained regret minimization problem this reduces to the compu-
tation of a best-response action to q∗n. This problem is further discussed in Section
5.
The proof of the last Theorem follows from the next result, which also provides less
specific conditions on the required choice of (pn, q
∗
n).
Proposition 7
(i) Suppose that at each time step n ≥ 1, the agent chooses the triple (pn, q∗n, p∗n) so that
λn−1 · (r(pn, z)− r(p∗n, q∗n)) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z, (11)
and sets r∗n = r(p∗n, q∗n). Then it holds that
‖λn‖ ≤ ρ√
n
∀n ≥ 1.
(ii) If, in addition, p∗n is chosen as an S-response to q∗n, so that r∗n = r(p∗n, q∗n) ∈ S, then
d (r¯n, S) ≤ ‖λn‖ ≤ ρ√
n
, n ≥ 1, (12)
The specific choice of (pn, q
∗
n) in equations (8)-(9) satisfies the requirement in (11), as
argued below. Indeed, the latter requirement is less restrictive, and can replace (8)-(9) in
the definition of the basic algorithm. However, the former choice is convenient as it ensures
that (11) holds for any choice of p∗n.
We proceed to the proof of Proposition 7 and Theorem 6. We first establish a useful
recursive relation for ‖λn‖2.
Lemma 8 For any n ≥ 1, we have that
n2 ‖λn‖2 ≤ (n − 1)2 ‖λn−1‖2 + 2(n− 1)λn−1 · (r∗n − rn) + ρ2.
where ρ is the span of the reward function (1).
Proof We have that
‖r¯∗n − r¯n‖2 =
∥∥∥∥n− 1n (r¯∗n−1 − r¯n−1)+ 1n (r∗n − rn)
∥∥∥∥
2
=
(
n− 1
n
)2 ∥∥r¯∗n−1 − r¯n−1∥∥2 + 1n2 ‖r∗n − rn‖2
+2
n− 1
n2
(
r¯∗n−1 − r¯n−1
) · (r∗n − rn)
≤
(
n− 1
n
)2 ∥∥r¯∗n−1 − r¯n−1∥∥2 + ρ2n2
+2
n− 1
n2
(
r¯∗n−1 − r¯n−1
) · (r∗n − rn) ,
10
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Algorithm 1 Response-Based Approachability
Initialization: At time step n = 1, use arbitrary mixed action p1 and set an arbitrary
target point r∗1 ∈ S.
At time step n = 2, 3, ...:
1. Set an approachability direction
λn−1 = r¯∗n−1 − r¯n−1,
where
r¯n−1 =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
k=1
r(pk, zk), r¯
∗
n−1 =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
k=1
r∗k
are, respectively, the average (smoothed) reward vector and the average target point.
2. Solve a zero-sum matrix game with the scalar reward function λn−1 · r(p, q). In
particular, find the optimal mixed action pn and q
∗
n that satisfy
pn ∈ argmax
p∈∆(A)
min
q∈∆(Z)
λn−1 · r(p, q),
q∗n ∈ argmin
q∈∆(Z)
max
p∈∆(A)
λn−1 · r(p, q).
3. Choose action an according to pn.
4. Pick p∗n so that r(p∗n, q∗n) ∈ S, and set the target point
r∗n = r(p
∗
n, q
∗
n).
where ρ is the reward bound defined in (1). The proof is concluded by multiplying both
sides of the inequality by n2.
Proof [Proof of Proposition 7.] Under condition (11), we have for all n that
λn−1 · (r∗n − rn) = λn−1 · (r(p∗n, q∗n)− r(pn, zn)) ≤ 0.
Hence, by Lemma 8,
n2 ‖λn‖2 ≤ (n− 1)2 ‖λn−1‖2 + ρ2, n ≥ 1.
Applying this inequality recursively, we obtain that
n2 ‖λn‖2 ≤ nρ2, n ≥ 1
or
‖λn‖2 ≤ ρ2/n, n ≥ 1,
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as claimed in part (i). Part (ii) now follows since r∗n ∈ S (for all n) implies that r¯∗n ∈ S
(recall that S is a convex set), hence
d (r¯n, S) ≤ ‖r¯n − r¯∗n‖ = ‖λn‖ .
Proof [Proof of Theorem 6.] It only remains to show that the choice of (pn, q
∗
n) in equations
(8)-(9) implies the required inequality in (11). Indeed, under (8) and (9) we have that
λn−1 · r(pn, zn) ≥ max
p∈∆(A)
min
q∈∆(Z)
λn−1 · r(p, q)
= min
q∈∆(Z)
max
p∈∆(A)
λn−1 · r(p, q)
, max
p∈∆(A)
λn−1 · r(p, q∗n)
≥ λn−1 · r(p∗n, q∗n),
where the equality follows by the minimax theorem for matrix games. Therefore, condition
(11) is satisfied for any p∗n, and in particular for the one satisfying r(p∗n, q∗n) ∈ S. This
concludes the proof of the Theorem.
4. Interpretation and Extensions
We open this section with an illuminating interpretation of the proposed algorithm in terms
of a certain approachability problem in an auxiliary game, and proceed to present several
variants and extensions to the basic algorithm. While each of these variants is presented
separately, they may also be combined when appropriate.
4.1 An Auxiliary Game Interpretation
A central part of Algorithm 1 is the choice of the pair (pn, q
∗
n) so that r¯n tracks r¯
∗
n, namely
λn = r¯
∗
n − r¯n → 0 (see Equations (8)-(9) and Proposition 7). If fact, the choice of (pn, q∗n)
in (8)-(9) can be interpreted as Blackwell’s strategy for a specific approachability problem
in an auxiliary game, which we define next.
Suppose that at time n, the agent chooses a pair of actions (a, z∗) ∈ A × Z and the
opponent chooses a pair of actions (a∗, z) ∈ A×Z. The vector payoff function, now denoted
by v, is given by
v((a, z∗), (a∗, z)) = r(a∗, z∗)− r(a, z),
so that
Vn = r(a
∗
n, z
∗
n)−Rn.
Consider the single-point target set S0 = {0} ⊂ Rℓ. This set is clearly convex, and we next
show that it is a D-set in the auxiliary game. We need to show that for any η ∈ ∆(A×Z)
there exists µ ∈ ∆(A×Z) so that v(µ, η) ∈ S0, namely v(µ, η) = 0. That that end, observe
that
v(µ, η) = r(p∗, q∗)− r(p, q)
12
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where p and q∗ are the marginal distributions of µ on A and Z, respectively, while p∗ and q
are the respective marginal distributions of η. Therefore we obtain v(µ, η) = 0 by choosing
µ with the same marginals as η, for example {µ(a, z) = p(a)q∗(z)} with p = p∗ and q∗ = q.
Thus, by Theorem 3, S0 is approachable.
We may now apply Blackwell’s approachability strategy to this auxiliary game. Since
S0 is the origin, the direction from S0 to the average reward V¯n−1 is just the average reward
vector itself. Therefore, the primal (geometric separation) condition here is equivalent to
V¯n−1 · v(µ, η) ≤ 0, ∀ η ∈ ∆(A×Z)
or
V¯n−1 · (r(p∗, q∗)− r(p, q)) ≤ 0, ∀ p∗ ∈ ∆(A), q ∈ ∆(Z).
Now, a pair (p, q∗) that satisfies this inequality is any pair of equilibrium strategies in the
zero-sum game with reward v projected in the direction of V¯n−1. That is, for
p ∈ argmax
p∈∆(A)
min
q∈∆(Z)
V¯n−1 · r(p, q), (13)
q∗ ∈ argmin
q∈∆(Z)
max
p∈∆(A)
V¯n−1 · r(p, q), (14)
it is easily verified that
V¯n−1 · r(p∗, q∗) ≥ V¯n−1 · r(p, q), ∀ p∗ ∈ ∆(A), q ∈ ∆(Z)
as required.
The choice of (pn, q
∗
n) in Equations (8)-(9) follows (13)-(14), with λn−1 replacing V¯n−1.
We note that the two are not identical, as V¯n is the temporal average of Vn = r(a
∗
n, z
∗
n) −
r(an, zn) while λn is the average the smoothed difference r(p
∗
n, q
∗
n)− r(pn, zn); however this
does not change the approachability result above, and in fact either can be used. More
generally, any approachability algorithm in the auxiliary game can be used to choose the
pair (pn, q
∗
n) in Algorithm 1.
We note that in our original problem, the mixed action q∗n is not chosen by an “opponent”
but rather specified as part of Algorithm 1. But since the approachability result above holds
for an arbitrary choice of q∗n, it also holds for this particular one.
We proceed to present some additional variants of our algorithm.
4.2 Idling when Inside S
Recall that in the original approachability algorithm of Blackwell, an arbitrary action an
can be chosen by the agent whenever r¯n−1 ∈ S. This may reduce the computational burden
of the algorithm, and adds another degree of freedom that may be used to optimize other
criteria.
Such arbitrary choice of an (or pn) when the average reward is in S is also possible in
our algorithm. However, some care is required in the setting of the average target point r¯∗n
over these time instances, as otherwise the two terms of the difference λn = r¯
∗
n − r¯n may
drift apart. As it turns out, what is required is simply to shift the average target point r¯∗n
13
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to r¯n at these time instances, and use the modified point in the computation of the steering
direction λn. In recursive form, we obtain the following modified recursion:
λ˜0 = 0,
λ˜n =
{
n−1
n λ˜n−1 +
1
n(r
∗
n − rn), if r¯n /∈ S
0, if r¯n ∈ S,
n ≥ 1. (15)
It may be seen that the steering direction λ˜n is reset to 0 whenever the average reward is in
S. With this modified definition, we are able to maintain the same convergence properties
of the algorithm.
Proposition 9 Let Assumption 1 hold. Suppose that the agent uses Algorithm 1 with the
following modifications:
1. The steering direction λn−1 is replaced by the modifed direction λ˜n−1 defined recur-
sively in (15);
2. Whenever r¯n−1 ∈ S, an arbitrary action an is chosen.
Then, it holds that
d (r¯n, S) ≤ ρ√
n
, n ≥ 1,
for any strategy of the opponent.
Proof We establish the claim in two steps. We first show that ‖λ˜n‖ bounds the Euclidean
distance of r¯n from S. We then show that ‖λ˜n‖ satisfies an analogue of Lemma 8, and
therefore the analysis of the previous section holds.
To see that d(r¯n, S) ≤ ‖λ˜n‖ for all n, observe that if r¯n ∈ S, then trivially d(r¯n, S) =
‖λ˜n‖ = 0. Assume next that r¯n /∈ S. Let n0 < n be the last instant n such that r¯n0 ∈ S.
Using the abbreviate notation
r¯m:n =
1
n−m+ 1
n∑
k=m
rk ,
and similarly for r¯∗m:n, we obtain
λ˜n =
1
n

 n∑
k=n0+1
r∗k −
n∑
k=n0+1
rk


=
n− n0
n
(
r¯n0+1:n − r¯∗n0+1:n
)
.
On the other hand,
d(r¯n, S) = d(
n0
n
r¯n0 +
n− n0
n
r¯n0+1:n, S)
≤ n0
n
d(r¯n0 , S) +
n− n0
n
d (r¯n0+1:n, S)
≤ 0 + n− n0
n
∥∥r¯n0+1:n − r¯∗n0+1:n∥∥
=
∥∥∥λ˜n∥∥∥ ,
14
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where the first inequality follows by the convexity of the point-to-set Euclidean distance to
a convex set, and the second inequality holds since
r¯∗n0+1:n =
1
n− n0
n∑
k=n0+1
r∗k ∈ S.
For the second step, note that the recursive definition (15) of λ˜n implies, similarly to
the proof of Lemma 8, that
n2
∥∥∥λ˜n∥∥∥2 ≤ (n − 1)2 ∥∥∥λ˜n−1∥∥∥2 + 2(n− 1)λ˜n−1 · (r∗n − rn) + ρ2.
Hence, when r¯n−1 ∈ S, we have that λ˜n−1 = 0, and arbitrary an and r∗n can be chosen.
Also, similarly to the analysis in Section 3, whenever r¯n−1 /∈ S, the solution (pn, q∗n) of the
zero-sum game in the direction λ˜n−1 ensures that
λ˜n−1 · (r(p∗n, q∗n)− r(pn, zn)) ≤ 0,
and thus the convergence of
∥∥∥λ˜n∥∥∥ to zero is implied.
4.3 Directionally Unbounded Target Sets
In some applications of interest, the target set S may be unbounded in certain directions.
Indeed, this is the case in the approachability formulation of the no-regret problem, where
the goal is essentially to make the average reward as large as possible. In particular, in
Blackwell’s formulation (Section 2.2.1), the set S = {(u, q) : u ≥ u∗(q)} is unbounded in
the direction of the first coordinate u. In Hart and Mas-Collel’s formulation (Section 2.2.2),
the set S = {L ≤ 0} is unbounded in the negative direction of all the coordinates of L.
In such cases, the requirement that λn = r¯
∗
n − r¯n → 0, which is a property of our
basic algorithm, may be too strong, and may even be counter-productive. For example,
in Blackwell’s no-regret formulation mentioned above, we would like to increase the first
coordinate of r¯n as much as possible, hence allowing negative values of λn makes sense
(rather than steering that coordinate to 0 by reducing r¯n). We propose next a modification
of our algorithm that addresses this issue.
Given the (closed and convex) target set S ⊂ Rℓ, let DS be the set of vectors d ∈ Rℓ
such that d + S ⊂ S. It may be seen that DS is a closed and convex cone, which trivially
equals {0} if (and only if) S is bounded. We refer to the unit vectors in DS as directions
in which S is unbounded.
Referring to the auxiliary game interpretation of our algorithm in Section 4.1, we may
now relax the requirement that λn approaches {0} to the requirement that λn approaches
−DS . Indeed, if we maintain r¯∗n ∈ S as before, then λn ∈ −DS suffices to verify that
r¯n = r¯
∗
n − λn ∈ S.
We may now apply Blackwell’s approachability strategy to the cone DS in place of the
origin. The required modification to the algorithm is simple: replace the steering direction
λn in (8)-(9) or (11) with the direction from the closest point in −DS to λn:
λ˜n = λn − Proj−DS(λn)
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That projection is particularly simple in case S is unbounded along primary coordinates,
so that the cone DS is a quadrant, generated by a collection ej , j ∈ J of orthogonal unit
vectors. In that case, clearly,
Proj−DS (λ) = −
∑
j∈J
(ej · λ)− .
Thus, the negative components of λn in directions (ej) are nullified.
The modified algorithm admits analogous bounds to those of the basic algorithm, with
(10) or (12) replaced by
d (r¯n, S) ≤ d(λn,−DS) ≤ ρ√
n
, n ≥ 1.
The proof is similar and will thus be omitted.
4.4 Using the Non-smoothed Rewards
In the basic algorithm of Section 3, the definition of the steering direction λn employs the
smoothed rewards r(pk, zk) rather than the actual ones, namely Rk = r(ak, zk). We consider
here the case where the latter are used. This is essential in case that the opponent’s action
zk is not observed, so that r(pk, zk) cannot be computed, but rather the reward vector Rk
is observed directly. It also makes sense since the quantity we are actually interested in is
the average reward R¯n, and not its smoothed version r¯n.
Thus, we replaced λn−1 with
λ˜n−1 = r¯∗n−1 − R¯n−1.
The rest of the algorithm is the same as Algorithm 1. We have the following result for this
variant.
Theorem 10 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, if the agent uses Algorithm 1, with
λn−1 replaced by
λ˜n−1 = r¯∗n−1 − R¯n−1.
it holds that
lim
n→∞ ‖λ˜n‖ = 0,
almost surely, for any strategy of the opponent, at a uniform rate of O(1/
√
n) over all
strategies of the opponent. More precisely, for every δ > 0, we have that
P
{
max
k≥n
‖λ˜k‖ ≤
√
6ρ2
δn
}
≥ 1− δ. (16)
Proof First observe that Lemma 8 still holds if rn = r(pn, zn) is replaced with Rn =
r(an, zn) throughout. Namely,
n2‖λ˜n‖2 ≤ (n− 1)2‖λ˜n−1‖2 + 2(n− 1)λ˜n−1 · (r∗n − r(an, zn)) + ρ2, n ≥ 1.
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Let {Fn} denote the filtration induced by the history. We have that
E
[
n2‖λ˜n‖2
∣∣∣ Fn−1] ≤ (n− 1)2‖λ˜n−1‖2 + 2(n − 1)λ˜n−1 · E [(r∗n − r(an, zn)) | Fn−1] + ρ2
= (n− 1)2‖λ˜n−1‖2 + 2(n − 1)λ˜n−1 · (r∗n − E [r(an, zn) | Fn−1]) + ρ2
≤ (n− 1)2‖λ˜n−1‖2 + ρ2, (17)
where the equality follows since q∗n and p∗n are determined by the history up to time n − 1
and hence so does r∗n = r(p∗n, q∗n), and the last inequality holds since
λ˜n−1 · (r∗n − E [r(an, zn) | Fn−1]) ≤ 0,
similarly to the proof of Theorem 6. Now, we can proceed as in the original proof of
Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell (1956), Theorem 1) or use Proposition 4.1 in Shimkin and
Shwartz (1993) to deduce that a sequence ‖λ˜n‖ satisfying (17) converges to zero almost
surely at a uniform rate that depends only on ρ. In particular, using the proof of Proposition
4.1 in Shimkin and Shwartz (1993) we know that for every ǫ > 0 and δ > 0, there exists
N = N(ǫ, δ, ρ) so that
P
{
∃n ≥ N : ‖λ˜n‖ ≥ ǫ
}
≤ δ,
where N can be chosen to be any constant greater than 6ρ
2
δǫ2 . This completes the proof of
the Theorem.
5. Generalized No-Regret Algorithms
The proposed approachability algorithms can be usefully applied to several generalized
regret minimization problems, in which the computation of a projection onto the target set
is involved, but a response is readily obtainable. We start by providing a generic description
of the problem using a general set-valued goal function, and then specialize the discussion
to some specific goal functions that have been considered in the recent literature. We do
not consider convergence rates in these section, but rather focus on asymptotic convergence
results. Convergence rates can readily be derived by referring to our bounds in the previous
sections; see, e.g., (10) or (16).
Consider a repeated matrix game as before, where the vector-valued reward r(a, z) is
replaced with v(a, z) ∈ RK . Suppose that for each mixed action q of the opponent, the
agent has a satisficing1 payoff set V ∗(q) ⊂ RK , and at least one mixed action p = p∗(q)
that satisfies v(p, q) ∈ V ∗(q). We refer to any such action as a response of the agent to q.
Let V ∗ : q ∈ ∆(Z) 7→ V ∗(q) denote the corresponding set-valued goal function. As before,
let Vn = v(an, zn) and V¯n =
1
n
∑n
k=1 Vk. A generalized no-regret strategy for this model
may be defined as strategy for the agent that ensures
lim
n→∞ d(V¯n, V
∗(q¯n)) = 0 (a. s.)
1. Borrowing from H. Simon’s terminology for achieving satisfying (or good-enough) results in decision
making.
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for any strategy of the opponent. If such a strategy exists, we say that the goal function
V ∗ is attainable by the agent.
The classical no-regret problem is obtained as a special case, with scalar reward v(a, z) =
u(a, z) and satisficing payoff set V ∗(q) = {v ∈ R : v ≥ v∗(q)}, where v∗(q) , maxp v(p, q).
As shown in Section 2.2.1, this problem can be formulated as a particular case of approach-
ability to the set S = {(v, q) : v ∈ V ∗(q)}, and existence of approaching strategies relies on
convexity of the function v∗(q), which implies convexity of S.
A similar line of reasoning may be pursued for the generalized no-regret problem de-
scribed above. The no-regret property is clearly equivalent to approachability of the set
S = {(v, q) : v ∈ V ∗(q)}, in the game with reward vector r(p, q) = (v(p, q), q). As convexity
of S, hence of V ∗, plays an important role, we recall the following definition for set-valued
functions.
Definition 11 (Convex hull) A set valued function V : q ∈ ∆(Z) 7→ V (q) ⊂ RK is
convex if αV (q1) + (1− α)V (q2) ⊂ V (αq1 + (1− α)q2) for any q1, q2 and α ∈ [0, 1] (where
the first plus sign stands for the Minkowski sum). The convex hull V c of V is the minimal
set-valued function which is convex and contains V , in the sense that V (q) ⊂ V c(q) for
each q. Note that a minimal member (in the sense of set inclusion) exists, as the required
property is invariant under intersections.
The following claims follow easily from the definition of S.
Proposition 12
(i) The set S = {(v, q) : v ∈ V ∗(q)} is a D-set. Hence, its convex hull conv(S) is
approachable.
(ii) If the set-valued goal function V ∗ is convex, then it is attainable by the agent. In
general, the convex hull V c of V ∗ is attainable by the agent.
Proof To see that S is a D-set, note that by its definition, for any q there exists p such
that v(p, q) ∈ V ∗(q), hence (v(p, q), q) ∈ S. Therefore conv(S) is a convex D-set, which is
approachable by Theorem 3. Claim (ii) now follows by verifying that conv(S) = {(v, q) :
v ∈ V c(q)}.
It follows that any convex goal function V ∗ is attainable. When V ∗ is not convex, which
is often the case, one may need to resort to a relaxed goal function, namely the convex
hull V c. The computation of V c and its suitability as a (relaxed) goal function need to be
examined for each specific problem.
As a consequence of Proposition 12, V c (or V ∗ itself when convex) can be attained by
any approachability algorithm applied to the convex set conv(S) = {(v, q) : v ∈ V c(q)}.
However, the required projection unto that set may be hard to compute. This is especially
true when V ∗ is non-convex, as V c my be hard to compute explicitly. In such cases,
the Response-Based Approachability algorithm developed in this paper offers a convenient
alternative, as it only requires to compute at each stage a response of the agent to a certain
mixed action of the opponent, relative to the original goal function V ∗. As seen below, this
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computation typically requires the solution of an optimization problem, which is inherent
in the definition of V ∗.
We next specialize the discussion to certain concrete models of interest.
Algorithm 2 Generalized No-Regret Algorithm
Input: Desired reward sets, represented by the multifunction V ∗ : ∆(Z)→ RK .
Initialization: At time step n = 1, use arbitrary mixed action p1, and set arbitrary values
v∗1 ∈ RK , q∗1 ∈ ∆(Z).
At time step n = 2, 3, ...:
1. Set
λv,n−1 = v¯∗n−1 − v¯n−1, λq,n−1 = q¯∗n−1 − q¯n−1,
where
v¯∗n−1 =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
k=1
v∗k, q¯
∗
n−1 =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
k=1
q∗k.
2. Solve the following zero-sum matrix game:
pn ∈ argmax
p∈∆(A)
min
q∈∆(Z)
(λv,n−1 · v(p, q) + λq,n−1 · q) ,
q∗n ∈ argmin
q∈∆(Z)
max
p∈∆(A)
(λv,n−1 · v(p, q) + λq,n−1 · q) .
3. Choose action an according to pn.
4. Pick p∗n such that v (p∗n, q∗n) ∈ V ∗(q∗n), and set
v∗n = v(p
∗
n, q
∗
n).
5.1 Global Cost Functions
The following problem of regret minimization with global cost functions was introduced
in Even-Dar et al. (2009). Suppose that the goal of the agent is to minimize a general
(i.e., non-linear) function of the average reward vector V¯n. In particular, we are given a
continuous function G : RK → R, and the goal is to minimize G(V¯n). For example, G may
be some norm of V¯n. We define the best-cost-in-hindsight, given a mixed action q of the
opponent, as
G∗(q) , min
p∈∆(A)
G(v(p, q)),
so that the satisficing payoff set may be defined as
V ∗(q) = {v ∈ V0 : G(v) ≤ G∗(q)} ,
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where V0 = conv{v(a, z)}a∈A,z∈Z is the set of feasible reward vectors. Clearly, the agent’s
response to q is any mixed action that minimizes G(v(p, q)), namely
p∗(q) ∈ argmin
p∈∆(A)
G(v(p, q)). (18)
By Proposition 12, the convex hull V c of V ∗ is attainable by the agent. The relation
between V c and V ∗ can be seen depend on convexity properties of G and G∗. In particular,
we have the following immediate result (a slight extension of Even-Dar et al. (2009)).
Proposition 13
(i) For q ∈ ∆(Z),
V c(q) ⊂ {v ∈ V0 : conv(G)(v) ≤ conc(G∗)(q)} ,
where conv(G) and conc(G∗) are the lower convex hull of G and the upper concave
hull of G∗, respectively.
(ii) Consequently, if G(v) is a convex function over v ∈ V0, then the relaxed goal function
conc(G∗)(q) is attainable.
(iii) If, furthermore, G∗(q) is a concave function of q, then V c = V ∗, and the goal function
G∗(q) is attainable.
Clearly, if G∗(q) is not concave, the attainable goal function is weaker than the original
one. Still, this relaxed goal is meaningful, at least in cases where G(v) is convex (case (ii)
above), so that conc(G∗)(q) is attainable. Noting that G∗(q) ≤ maxq′ minpG(v(p, q′)), it
follows that
conc(G∗)(q) ≤ max
q′∈∆(Z)
min
p∈∆(A)
G(v(p, q′)) ≤ min
p∈∆(A)
max
q′∈∆(Z)
G(v(p, q′)) . (19)
The latter min-max bound is just the security level of the agent in the repeated game,
namely the minimal value of G(V¯n) that can be secured (as n → ∞) by playing a fixed
(non-adaptive) mixed action q′. Note that the second inequality in Equation (19) will be
strict except for special cases where the min-max theorem holds for G(v(p, q)) (which is
hardly expected if G∗(q) is non-concave).
Convexity of G(v) depends directly on its definition, and will hold for cases of interest
such as norm functions. Concavity of G∗(q), on the other hand, is more demanding and
will hold only in special cases. We give below two examples, one in which G(v) is convex
but G∗(q) is not necessarily concave, and one in which both properties are satisfied. In the
next subsection we discuss an example where neither is true.
Example 1 (Absolute Value) Let v : A × Z → R be a scalar reward function, and
suppose that we wish to minimize the deviation of the average reward V¯n from a certain set
value, say 0. Define then G(v) = |v|, and note that G is a convex function. Now,
G∗(q) , min
p∈∆(A)
|v(p, q)| =


mina∈A v(a, q) : v(a, q) > 0, a ∈ A
mina∈A(−v(a, q)) : v(a, q) < 0, a ∈ A
0 : otherwise
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The response p∗(q) of the agent is obvious from these relations. We can observe two special
case in this example:
(i) The problem reduces to the classical no-regret problem if the rewards v(a, z) all have
the same sign (positive or negative), as the absolute value can be removed. Indeed,
in this case G∗(q) is concave, as a minimum of linear functions.
(ii) If the set {v(a, q), a ∈ A} includes elements of opposite signs (0 included) for each q,
then G∗ = 0, and the point v = 0 becomes attainable.
In general, however, |v(p, q)| may be a strictly convex function of q for a fixed p, and the
minimization above need not lead to a concave function. In that case, we can ensure only
the attainability of conc(G∗)(q).
We note that the computation of conc(G∗) may be fairly complicated in general, which
implies the same for computing the projection onto the associated goal set S = {(v, q) :
|v| ≤ conc(G∗)(q)}. However, these computations are not needed in the proposed Response-
Based Approachability algorithm, where the required computation of the agent’s response
p∗(q) is straightforward.
Example 2 (Load Balancing) The following model was considered in Even-Dar et al.
(2009), motivated by load balancing and job scheduling problems. Consider a scalar loss
function ℓ : A×Z → R, with ℓ(a, z) ≥ 0, and define a corresponding vector-valued reward
function v : A×Z → R|A|, where v(a, z) has ℓ(a, z) at entry a and 0 otherwise:
v(a, z)[a′] =
{
ℓ(a, z), a = a′
0, otherwise.
The average reward vector then represents the the average loss of the agent on different
actions. Namely,
V¯n[a] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
I {a = ak} ℓ(a, zk).
Also, note that
v(p, q) = {p(a)ℓ(a, q)}a∈A , p⊙ ℓ(·, q),
and
G∗(q) = min
p∈∆(A)
G(v(p, q)) = min
p∈∆(A)
G (p⊙ ℓ(·, q)) .
Even-Dar et al. (2009) analyzed the case where G is either the d-norm with d > 1, or the
infinity norm (the makespan). Clearly G is convex here. Furthermore, it was shown that
the function
F ∗(ℓ) , min
p∈∆(A)
G (p⊙ ℓ)
is concave in ℓ. Now, since G∗(q) = F ∗(ℓ(·, q)) and ℓ(·, q) is linear in q, then G∗(q) is also
concave in q.
The agent’s response is easily computed for this problem: The response p = p∗(q) is
generally mixed, with pa proportional to ℓ(a, q)
−d/(d−1) for d <∞, and to ℓ(a, q)−1 for the
infinity norm.
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5.2 Reward-to-Cost Maximization
Consider the repeated game model as before, where the goal of the agent is to maximize the
ratio U¯n/C¯n. Here, U¯n is the average of a scalar reward function u(a, z) and C¯n is the average
of a scalar positive cost function c(a, z). This problem is mathematically equivalent to the
problem of regret minimization in repeated games with variable stage duration considered
in Mannor and Shimkin (2008) (in that paper, the cost was specifically taken as the stage
duration). Observe that this problem is a particular case of the global cost function problem
presented in Section 5.1, with vector-valued payoff function v(a, z) = (u(a, z), c(a, z)) and
G(v) = −u/c. However, here G(v) is not convex in v. We will therefore need to apply
specific analysis in order to obtain similar bounds to those of Proposition 13(ii).
We mention that similar bounds to the ones established below were obtained in Mannor
and Shimkin (2008). The algorithm there was based on playing a best-response to calibrated
forecasts of the opponent’s mixed actions. As mentioned in the introduction, obtaining
these forecasts is computationally hard, and the present formulation offers a considerably
less demanding alternative.
Denote
ρ(a, q) ,
u(a, q)
c(a, q)
, ρ(p, q) ,
u(p, q)
c(p, q)
.
and let
val(ρ) , max
p∈∆(A)
min
q∈∆(Z)
ρ(p, q) = min
q∈∆(Z)
max
p∈∆(A)
ρ(p, q)
(the last equality is proved in the above-mentioned paper; note that ρ(p, q) is not generally
concave-convex). It may be seen that val(ρ) is the value of the zero-sum repeated game
with payoffs U¯n/C¯n, hence serves as a security level for the agent. A natural goal for the
agent would be to improve on val(ρ) whenever the opponent’s actions deviate (in terms of
their empirical mean) from the minimax optimal strategy.
Let
ρ∗(q) , max
p∈∆(A)
ρ(p, q)
denote the best ratio-in-hindsight. We apply Algorithm 2, with v = (u, c) and the satisficing
payoff set
V ∗(q) =
{
v = (u, c) :
u
c
≥ ρ∗(q)
}
(observe that both ρ∗(q) and V ∗(q) are non-convex functions in general). The agent’s
response is given by any mixed action
p∗(q) ∈ P ∗(q) , argmax
p∈∆(A)
ρ(p, q).
It is easily verified that the maximum can always be obtained here in pure actions (Mannor
and Shimkin (2008); see also the proof of Prop. 15 below). Denote
A∗(q) , argmax
a∈A
ρ(a, q),
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and define the following relaxation of ρ∗(q):
ρ1(q) , inf


∑J
j=1 u(aj , qj)∑J
j=1 c(aj , qj)
: 1 ≤ J <∞, qj ∈ ∆(Z), 1
J
J∑
j=1
qj = q, aj ∈ A∗(qj)

 . (20)
Clearly, ρ1(q) ≤ ρ∗(q). We will show below that ρ1 is attained by applying Algorithm 2 to
this problem. First, however, we compare ρ1 to the security level val(ρ).
Lemma 14
(i) ρ1(q) ≥ val(ρ) for all q ∈ ∆(Z).
(ii) ρ1(q) > val(ρ) whenever ρ
∗(q) > val(ρ).
(iii) If q corresponds to a pure action z, namely q = δz, then ρ1(q) = ρ
∗(q).
(iv) ρ1(q) is a continuous function of q.
Proof To prove this Lemma, we first derive a more convenient expression for ρ1(q). For
a ∈ A, let
Qa , {q ∈ ∆(Z) : a ∈ A∗(q)}
denote the (closed) set of mixed actions to which a is a best-response action. Observe that
for given J , q1, ..., qJ and aj ∈ A∗(qj), we have
∑J
j=1 u(aj , qj)∑J
j=1 c(aj , qj)
=
∑
a∈ANau(a, q¯a)∑
a∈ANac(a, q¯a)
,
where
Na =
J∑
j=1
I {aj = a} , q¯a = 1
Na
J∑
j=1
I {aj = a} qj .
Note that q¯a ∈ conv(Qa) as it is a convex combination of qj ∈ Qa. Therefore, the definition
in (20) is equivalent to
ρ1(q) = min
{∑
a∈A αau(a, qa)∑
a∈A αac(a, qa)
: α ∈ ∆(A), qa ∈ conv(Qa),
∑
a∈A
αaqa = q
}
.
Now, this is exactly the definition of the so-called calibration envelope in Mannor and
Shimkin (2008), and the claims of the lemma follow by Lemma 6.1 and Proposition 6.4
there.
It may be seen that ρ1(q) does not fall below the security level val(q), and is strictly
above it when q is not a minimax action with respect to ρ(p, q). Furthermore, at the vertices
vertices of ∆(Z), it actually coincides with the best ratio-in-hindsight ρ∗(q).
We proceed to the following result that proves the attainability of ρ1(q).
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Proposition 15 Consider Algorithm 2 applied to the model of the present Subsection. Sup-
pose that the response action to q∗n is chosen as any action p∗n ∈ P ∗(q∗n) and consequently
the target point is set to v∗n = (u(p∗n, q∗n), c(p∗n, q∗n)). Then,
lim inf
n→∞
(
U¯n
C¯n
− ρ1(q¯n)
)
≥ 0 (a.s.)
for any strategy of the opponent.
Proof Algorithm 2 ensures that, with probability 1,
‖q¯n − q¯∗n‖ → 0, (21)∣∣∣∣∣U¯n − 1n
n∑
k=1
u(p∗k, q
∗
k)
∣∣∣∣∣→ 0,
∣∣∣∣∣C¯n − 1n
n∑
k=1
c(p∗k, q
∗
k)
∣∣∣∣∣→ 0; (22)
see Theorem 6 and recall the asymptotic equivalence of smoothed and non-smoothed aver-
ages. Noting that the cost c is positive and bounded away zero, (22) implies that
lim
n→∞
U¯n
C¯n
= lim
n→∞
∑n
k=1 r(p
∗
k, q
∗
k)∑n
k=1 c(p
∗
k, q
∗
k)
. (23)
Let
ρ2(q) , inf


∑J
j=1 u(pj , qj)∑J
j=1 c(pj, qj)
: 1 ≤ J <∞, qj ∈ ∆(Z), 1
J
J∑
j=1
qj = q, pj ∈ P ∗(qj)

 . (24)
Clearly, ∑n
k=1 r(p
∗
k, q
∗
k)∑n
k=1 c(p
∗
k, q
∗
k)
≥ ρ2(q¯∗n). (25)
Also, it may be verified that the infimum in (24) is obtained in pure actions aj ∈ A∗(qj),
implying that
ρ2(q) = ρ1(q). (26)
Indeed, note that ∑J
j=1 u(pj , qj)∑J
j=1 c(pj, qj)
≤ K
is equivalent to
J∑
j=1
u(pj , qj)−K
J∑
j=1
c(pj , qj) ≤ 0.
Now, consider minimizing the left-hand-side over pj ∈ P ∗(qj). Due to the linearity in pj
and the fact that P ∗(qj) is just the mixture of actions in A∗(qj), the optimal actions are
pure (that is, in A∗(qj)).
Combining (23), (25), and (26), we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
(
U¯n
C¯n
− ρ1(q¯∗n)
)
≥ 0.
The proof is concluded by using (21) and the continuity of ρ1 (see Lemma 14).
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5.3 Constrained Regret Minimization
We finally address the constrained regret minimization problem, introduced in Mannor
et al. (2009). Here, in addition to the scalar reward function u, we are given a vector-
valued cost function c : A × Z → Rs. We are also given a closed and convex set Γ ⊆ Rs,
the constraint set, which specifies the allowed values for the long-term average cost. A
specific common case is that of a linear constraint on each cost component, that is Γ =
{c ∈ Rs : ci ≤ γi, i = 1, ..., s} for some given vector γ ∈ Rs. The constraint set is assumed
to be feasible (or not excludable), in the sense that for every q ∈ ∆(Z), there exists p ∈ ∆(A)
such that c(p, q) ∈ Γ.
Let C¯n , n
−1∑n
k=1 ck denote, as before, the average cost by time n. The agent is
required to satisfy the cost constraints, in the sense that limn→∞ d(C¯n,Γ) = 0 must hold,
irrespectively of the opponent’s play. Subject to these constraints, the agent wishes to
maximize its average reward U¯n.
We observe that a concrete learning application for the constrained regret minimization
problem was proposed in Bernstein et al. (2010). There, we considered the on-line problem
of merging the output of multiple binary classifiers, with the goal of maximizing the true-
positive rate, while keeping the false-positive rate under a given threshold 0 < γ < 1. As
shown in that paper, this problem may be formulated as a constrained regret minimization
problem.
A natural extension of the best-reward-in-hindsight u∗(q) in (2) to the constrained set-
ting is given by
u∗Γ(q) , max
p∈∆(A)
{u(p, q) : c(p, q) ∈ Γ} . (27)
We can now define the satisficing payoff set of the pairs v = (u, c) ∈ R1+s in terms of u∗Γ(q)
and Γ:
V ∗(q) ,
{
v = (u, c) ∈ R1+s : u ≥ u∗Γ(q), c ∈ Γ
}
.
Note that u∗Γ(q) is not convex in general, and consequently V
∗(q) is not convex as well.
Indeed, it was shown in Mannor et al. (2009) that V ∗(q) is not approachable in general.
The convex hull of V ∗(q) may be written as
V c(q) =
{
(u, c) ∈ Rs+1 : u ≥ conv (u∗Γ) (q), c ∈ Γ
}
, (28)
where the function conv (u∗Γ) is the lower convex hull of u
∗
Γ.
Two algorithms were proposed in Mannor et al. (2009) for attaining V c(q). The first
is a standard (Blackwell’s) approachability algorithm for S = {(v, q) : v ∈ V c(q)}, which
requires the demanding calculation of projection directions to S. The second algorithm
employs a best-response to calibrated forecasts of the opponent’s mixed actions. As men-
tioned in the introduction, obtaining these forecasts is computationally hard. In contrast,
our algorithm only requires the computation of the response p∗(q) as any maximizing action
in (27). Similarly to the case of global cost functions, step 4 of Algorithm 2 boils down to
solving the optimization problem in (27) for q = q∗n. Note that p∗n can be efficiently com-
puted for a given q∗n since (27) is a convex program in general, while it is a linear program
whenever the constraints set is a polyhedron.
Remark 16 Note that since V c(q) is unbounded in the direction of its first coordinate u,
the algorithm variant presented in Subsection 4.3 can be applied. In this case, the first
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coordinate of the steering direction λn can be set to zero in λ˜n whenever it is negative,
which corresponds to u¯n−1 ≥ u¯∗n−1, thereby avoiding an unnecessary reduction in u¯n−1.
Similarly, for linear constraint sets of the form {ci ≤ γi}, the ci-coordinate of λn may be
nullified whenever [c¯n−1]i ≤ [c¯∗n−1]i.
A similar modification can be applied also in the reward-to-cost problem of Section 5.2.
That is, the u-coordinate of λn can be set to zero whenever u¯n−1 ≥ u¯∗n−1, while the c-
coordinate of λn may be nullified whenever c¯n−1 ≤ c¯∗n−1.
6. Conclusion
We have introduced in this paper a class of approachability algorithms that are based on
Blackwell’s dual, rather than primal, approachability condition. The proposed algorithms
rely directly on the availability of a response function, rather than projection onto the
goal set (or related geometric quantities), and are therefore convenient in certain problems
where the latter may be hard to compute. At the same time, the additional computational
requirements are generally comparable to those of the standard Blackwell algorithm and its
variants.
The proposed algorithms were applied to a class of generalized no-regret problems,
that includes reward-to-cost maximization, and reward maximization subject to average-
cost constraints. The resulting algorithms are apparently the first computationally efficient
algorithms in this generalized setting.
In this paper we have focused on a repeated matrix game model, where the action sets
of the agent and the adversary in the stage game are both discrete. It is worth pointing out
that the essential results of this paper also apply directly to models with convex action sets
are convex, say x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , and the vector reward function r(x, y) is bilinear in its
arguments. In that case the (observed) actions x and y simply take the place of the mixed
actions p and q, leading to similar algorithms and convergence results. The continuous-
action model is of course relevant to linear classification and regression problems.
Other extensions of possible interest for the response-based algorithms suggested in
this paper include stochastic game models, problems of partial monitoring, and possibly
nonlinear (concave-convex) reward functions. These are left for future work.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Shie Mannor for useful discussions, and for pointing out the application
to regret minimization with global cost functions. We further thank Elad Hazan for helpful
comments on the Appendix. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation
grant No. 1319/11.
References
J. Abernethy, P. L. Bartlett, and E. Hazan. Blackwell approachability and low-regret
learning are equivalent. In Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference on Learning Theory
(COLT ’12), 2012.
26
Response-Based Approachability
R.J. Aumann and M. Maschler. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. M.I.T Press,
1995.
A. Bernstein, S. Mannor, and N. Shimkin. Online classification with specificity constraints.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS ’10),
2010.
A. Bernstein, S. Mannor, and N. Shimkin. Opportunistic approachability and generalized
no-regret problems. To appear in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013. Also in the
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT ’13).
D. Blackwell. Controlled random walks. In Proceedings of the International Congress of
Mathematicians, volume III, pages 335–338, 1954.
D. Blackwell. An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs. Pacific Journal of
Mathematics, 6:1–8, 1956.
A. Blum and Y. Mansour. From external to internal regret. Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 8:1307–1324, 2007.
N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge University
Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006.
E. Even-Dar, R. Kleinberg, S. Mannor, and Y. Mansour. Online learning with global cost
functions. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT
’09), 2009.
D. Foster. A proof of calibration via blackwell’s approachability theorem. Games and
Economic Behavior, 29:73–78, 1999.
D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. The MIT Press, 1998.
J. Hannan. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. Contributions to the Theory of
Games, 3:97–139, 1957.
S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium.
Econometrica, 68:1127–1150, 2000.
S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell. A general class of adaptive strategies. Journal of Economic
Theory, 98:26–54, 2001.
E. Hazan and S. Kakade. (weak) Calibration is computationally hard. In Proceedings of the
25th Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT ’12), 2012.
E. Lehrer. Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces. International Journal of Game
Theory, 31:253–268, 2002.
E. Lehrer and E. Solan. Learning to play partially-specified equilibrium. Manuscript, 2007.
E. Lehrer and E. Solan. Approachability with bounded memory. Games and Economic
Behavior, 66(2):995–1004, 2009.
27
Bernstein and Shimkin
E. Lehrer and E. Solan. A general internal regret-free strategy. Manuscript, 2013.
S. Mannor and N. Shimkin. The empirical Bayes envelope and regret minimization in
competitive Markov decision processes. Mathematics of Operations Research, 28(2):327–
345, 2003.
S. Mannor and N. Shimkin. A geometric approach to multi-criterion reinforcement learning.
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 5:325–360, 2004.
S. Mannor and N. Shimkin. Regret minimization in repeated matrix games with variable
stage duration. Games and Economic Behavior, 63(1):227–258, 2008.
S. Mannor, J. N. Tsitsiklis, and J. Y. Yu. Online learning with sample path constraints.
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 10:569–590, 2009.
S. Mannor, V. Perchet, and G. Stoltz. Robust approachability and regret minimization
in games with partial monitoring. In Proceedings of the 24nd Annual Conference on
Learning Theory (COLT ’11), 2011.
E. Milman. Approachable sets of vector payoffs in stochastic games. Games and Economic
Behavior, 56(1):135–147, July 2006.
V. Perchet. Calibration and internal no-regret with partial monitoring. In Proceedings of
the 20th International Conference on Algorithmic Learning Theory (ALT ’09), 2009.
R.T. Rockafellar. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, 1970.
A. Rustichini. Minimizing regret: The general case. Games and Economic Behavior, 29:
224–243, 1999.
N. Shimkin and A. Shwartz. Guaranteed performance regions in Markovian systems with
competing decision makers. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 38(1):84–95, 1993.
A. N. Shiryaev. Probability. Springer, 1995.
X. Spinat. A necessary and sufficient condition for approachability. Mathematics of Oper-
ations Research, 27(1):31–44, 2002.
Nicolas Vieille. Weak approachability. Mathematics of Operations Research, 17(4):781–791,
1992.
H. P. Young. Strategic Learning and Its Limits. Oxford University Press, 2004.
M. Zinkevich. Online convex programming and generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent.
In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML ’03),
pages 928–936, 2003.
28
Response-Based Approachability
Appendix A
We outline in this Appendix a somewhat more direct version of the no-regret based ap-
proachability algorithms proposed in Abernethy et al. (2012). This version avoids the
lifting procedure used in that paper, that treats general (convex) target sets by lifting them
to convex cones in higher dimension. This brief outline is meant to highlight the geometric
nature and requirements of this class of algorithms.
Let S ⊆ Rℓ be the convex and closed target set to be approached. Let hS denote the
support function of S:
hS(θ) , sup
r∈S
(θ · r), θ ∈ Rℓ.
Note that hS is a convex function. The Euclidean distance from a point r to S may be
expressed as
d(r, S) = max
θ∈B2(1)
{θ · r − hS(θ)} , (29)
where B2(1) is the Euclidean unit ball, B2(1) = {θ ∈ Rℓ : θ ·θ ≤ 1} (see Rockafellar (1970),
Section 16; this equality can also be verified directly using the minimax theroem).
Blackwell’s (primal) separation condition can now be written as follows2:
• For each θ ∈ B2(1) there exist p ∈ ∆(Z) so that, for every q ∈ ∆(Z),
θ · r(p, q) ≤ sup
r∈S
θ · r ≡ hS(θ) ,
that is,
θ · r(p, q)− hS(θ) ≤ 0. (30)
An approachability algorithm can be devised as follows. Observe that the function
fr(θ) = θ · r − hS(θ) is concave in θ (for each r). Hence, an online concave programming
algorithm applied to the sequence of functions (θ · rn−hS(θ)), with rn arbitrary (bounded)
vectors, will produce a sequence of steering directions {θn} in B2(1) so that
1
n
n∑
k=1
(θk · rk − hS(θk)) ≥ max
θ∈B2(1)
{θ · r¯n − hS(θ)} − o(1). (31)
Now, observing (30), one can choose each pn so that rn = r(pn, zn) satisfies θn ·rn−hS(θn) ≤
0. Substituting in (31) we obtain
max
θ∈B2(1)
{θ · r¯n − hS(θ)} ≤ o(1).
Hence, by (29), d(r¯n, S) ≤ o(1).
Observe that the above scheme applies an online concave programming algorithm to the
functions fr(θ), that are defined through the support function hS(θ). Thus, it essentially
2. We use here the notations and formulation of the present paper, where p and q are mixed actions in
their respective simplices. However, the following observations are valid also for the case where p and
q are (observed) actions in bounded convex sets and r(p, q) a bilinear function thereof, as considered in
Abernethy et al. (2012).
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requires computing the support function hS (or its derivative) at some point in each stage
of the game.
To be specific, let us apply the gradient ascent algorithm of Zinkevich (2003) to the
problem. The resulting approachability algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. At stage n, we start with θn−1, pn−1, rn−1, zn−1 from the previous stage.
2. Let
θn = Proj(θn−1 − ηn∇θ(θn−1 · rn−1 − hS(θn−1))
= Proj(θn−1 − ηn(rn−1 −∇hS(θn−1)) (32)
where Proj is then projection onto the unit ball.
3. Choose pn according to (30), so that θn · r(pn, z)− hS(θn) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ Z.
4. Observe the opponent’s action zn, and set rn = r(pn, zn).
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